FOREWORD

 

 

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a unique forum where the governments of 30 market democracies work together to address the economic, social, environmental and governance challenges of globalization and development.

 

The OECD provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.

 

The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD.

 

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been a partner of the OECD for several years as part of the OECD-MENA Governance Programme[1]. This Programme aims at strengthening the capacity of public officials in Arab countries to design, implement and monitor public governance reforms. Through its respective working groups, the OECD-MENA Governance Programme supports Arab countries in reforming the civil service, preventing corruption and promoting integrity in the public sector, implementing e-government strategies, reducing administrative burdens on citizens and businesses within the government, improving public finance management and regulatory quality and promoting civil society participation in public policy making, to mention a few.

 

In the framework of the OECD-MENA Governance Program, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan launched an official request to implement an OECD Joint Learning Study (JLS) on “Implementing Codes of Conduct and Ethics in Civil Service”. The JLS is an innovative approach to knowledge creation and sharing between countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and OECD countries; a concept that was created through adapting the OECD peer review methodology to developing countries.

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 

The OECD’s Secretariat thanks the experts of participating countries and policy experts, namely, from the Kingdom of Bahrain, Ebrahim Kamal, Director of Regulatory and Media Affairs, Civil Service Bureau and Fareed Abdullah, Senior Employee Relations Specialist, Civil Service Bureau; from Austria, Stefan Ritter, Special Advisor to the Federal Chancellery; and from the United States of America, David Freel, Executive Director, Ohio Ethics Commission. Each of these experts took part in the mission to Jordan in March 2009, participated in interviews of and joint learning with officials, and contributed to the structure, findings, and proposals of this report.

 

The Secretariat also thanks Roth Judd, former, Director and General Counsel, State of Wisconsin Ethics Board, United States of America, for being the primary drafter and facilitator of this report, in addition to his service as an expert during the OECD Review Team’s mission to Jordan.

 

The Secretariat also thanks the many representatives of Jordan’s government who graciously agreed to share their knowledge, wisdom, and experiences during the mission to Jordan and whose contributions have enriched this report. These officials represented the following Jordanian offices and agencies:

 

§    Ministry of Public Sector Development

§    Audit Bureau

§    Civil Service Bureau

§    Anti-Corruption Commission

§    Government Tender Directorate

§    Ombudsman Bureau

§    Food and Drug Administration

§    Ministry of Finance

§    Jordan Customs

§    National Institute of Training

§    National Centre for Human Rights

§    King Abdullah II Center for Excellence

§    National Assembly

 

The report also relies on the valuable contributions of representatives of the private sector who gave of their time to share information with the Review Team about Jordan. These individuals were affiliated with:

§    Industrial Chamber

§    Commerce Chamber

§    Jordan Center for Social Research

 

Special thanks are also extended to members of the National Committee. It was the National Committee’s preparation and arrangements for the Review Team’s field mission to Jordan that made the mission a success. The Secretariat especially acknowledges Mr. Monther Batayneh, Counsellor for the Ministry of Public Sector Development, prior to and during the mission to Jordan, for his extraordinary efforts in facilitating our mission to Jordan and the preparations and arrangements for it, as well as for his continuous work as the Joint Learning Study’s MENA Project Coordinator throughout the project.

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

Foreword

 

Acknowledgements

 

About the Joint Learning Study

 

Executive Summary

 

Special appreciation of lessons that Jordan taught the Joint Learning Study Review Team

 

Introduction to the Jordanian context

Public administration reform in Jordan

Wasta in Jordanian society

 

Part I. The Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics

A.        A uniform code or multiple codes?

B.        Value or rule based standards?

C.        Detailed code of conduct of generally stated ethical standards?

D.        Retain, modify, or re-write current code? The merits of consultation with stakeholders

 

Part II. Administrative structure and legal basis

A.        Components and considerations for a successful administrative structure

B.        Review of possible administrative structures

C.        A legal basis for a uniform code of conduct and ethics and harmonizing it with other laws

 

Part III. Effective administration of a Code of Conduct and Ethics

A.        Should implementation be phased in? If so, how?

B.        Incentive-based programs

C.        Role of employee evaluations in strengthening government integrity

D.        Fostering awareness and devising educational programs

E.         A two-way street

F.         Gifts and gift registry

G.        Financial disclosure program

H.        Fostering compliance by providing guidance

I.          Complaints, investigations, adjudication, and legal procedures

J.         Consequences of violating a code of ethical conduct

K.        Agencies cooperation and other linkages

 

Part IV. Proposals for Action

 

 

ANNEXES

 

A.      Jordan’s legal system

 

B.          Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics for career public office (employment)(2006)

 

C.         United Nations resolution adopting “the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials” and recommending to member states as a tool to guide their efforts against corruption

 

D.         International Code of Conduct for Public Officials

 

E.          Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts’ Task Force 2007 Deliverables

Prepared by Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

 

F.          Policy experts who participated in the OECD Joint Learning Study on Jordan

 

 

About the Joint Learning Study

 

The concept

 

The Joint Learning Study employs the OECD’s peer review methodology. A key element of the concept is the involvement of policy experts from both OECD and MENA countries in order to ensure an in-depth policy discussion among peers and the mutuality of exchange between participating countries.

 

The Joint Learning Study is especially suitable to test progress in reform in the field of integrity and anti-corruption. It builds on the extensive experience gathered during the implementation of the OECD-MENA Governance Program, especially through its Working Group on Civil Service and Integrity.

 

 

Objectives

 

The Joint Learning Study on Jordan on Implementing Codes of Conduct and Ethics in Civil Service aims to provide an assessment of the current status of the implementation of Jordan’s Code of Conduct and Ethics for career public office (“Code of Conduct”) and an assessment of key aspects of integrity and anti-corruption policies and practices. The Study also discusses how the code of conduct, as a specific integrity instrument, fits into a wider picture of the Jordanian government’s efforts to fight corruption and enhance public integrity. Furthermore, the Joint Learning Study provides propos­als and good practices for improving the efficacy of the implementation of the code of conduct. Therefore, The Study also benchmarks the standards defined in the Jordanian code of conduct in an international context and will also seek to identify gaps in its implementation.

 

Jordan is currently undertaking a self-review of the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The Joint Learning Study makes reference to Article 8 of the UNCAC on Codes of conduct for public officials. Findings and pro­posals for action will be shared with the Government of Jordan as well as with organizations concerned with the monitoring and evaluation of the Convention’s implementation.

 

The main findings of the Jordanian Joint Learning Study will be discussed and disseminated in future conferences or workshops organized in the framework of the OECD-MENA Governance Program.

 

 

Methodology

 

Step 1: Preliminary research and stakeholder identification

 

The OECD Secretariat conducted preliminary research using the information that Jordan’s government provided and information available to the public (e.g. on the Internet). The Government of Jordan, and in particular the Ministry of Public Sector Development, provided the OECD Secretariat with written information – legislation, regulations, reports, etc. – related to Code of Conduct implementation and its wider institutional and regulatory context in Jordan. The initial phase of the project also included the selection of interviewees and target organizations from Jordan in the one hand, and of policy experts from OECD and Arab countries to be involved in the project on the other hand. Jordan’s government approved these project stakeholders before they proceeded further.

 

Step 2: Fact-finding field mission

 

During March 2009, the policy experts, accompanied by the OECD Secretariat (together forming the “JLS Review Team”) carried out a five-day field mission visiting Jordanian organizations from the public and private sectors. Each day of the mission, the JLS Review Team interviewed senior governmental officials and gathered information. These experts undertook an evalua­tion of the system and measures in place in order to agree on the main findings for the report. The field mission was a key feature of the process; it involved relevant stakeholders in charge of policy and practice in gathering and verifying the requisite information in the field.

 

Jordanian interviewees played a crucial role because they provided the JLS Review Team with first-hand field information. The Government of Jordan, based on the target institutions suggested by the OECD Secretariat, nominated the final list of Jordanian experts to be interviewed. The main interviewees were Jordanian government institutions responsible for the implementation of the code of conduct as well as ministries, control institu­tions, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Government Tender Directorate, the Ombudsman Bureau, the National Institute for Training and the Human Rights Center. The experts also interviewed some members of parliament, local representatives from international organizations, private sector, and civil society representatives.

 

The success of a field mission depended largely on the choice of policy experts involved as peer reviewers. Taking into account the Jordanian context, the JLS Review Team consisted of policy experts from the Kingdom of Bahrain, Austria, and the United States of America. The policy experts shared their country-specific good practices and knowledge of international practices and standards during the field mission and in the drafting of the Joint Learning Study.

 

Step 3: Drafting the report

 

At the conclusion of the fact-finding field mission, all members of the Joint Learning Study’s Review Team met to cross-check what they had learned and to discuss the Jordanian administrative landscape and its successes and challenges of ethical behaviour in governmental service. The Review Team found that the pertinent considerations rapidly sorted themselves into three main areas:

 

1.       The Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics, including its scope, values, and text;

2.       Administrative structure and legal basis for the code’s implementation and management;

3.       Effective administration of a Code of Conduct and Ethics, including best practices for implementing the code.

 

The Review Team directed the Lead Expert to prepare this draft report based on the fact-finding mission, the findings of the peer review experts, and the OECD Secretariat.

 

Step 4: Discussion and approval of the study

 

Findings, conclusions, and the draft report drawn from Steps 1, 2, and 3 are shared with Jordan for fact checking and feedback. The Joint Learning Study report supports the sharing of experience and lessons learned through discussion at regional seminars.

 

 

 

Executive Summary

 

Codes of conduct and ethics have proven to be important integrity instruments in many countries. They define standards of proper ethical behaviour for public officials.  An effective code of conduct and ethics contributes to instil citizens’ trust in their government’s integrity, to create an economic climate in which the seeds of domestic business sprout and thrive and to be a magnate for international businesses eager to do business in a nation of transparent processes, free from corrupt practices.

 

In 2006, the Ministry of Public Sector Development of Jordan, as part of wider modernisation efforts for the Jordanian public sector, developed the Code of Conduct and Ethics for Career Public Office (“Code of Conduct”). A key objective of the 2006 Code of Conduct is to fight wasta, a widespread phenomenon identified by stakeholders as harmful to the whole Jordanian society. Wasta refers to one person’s intervention or mediation on behalf of another that unfairly permits queue jumping or hiring, promoting and retaining individuals with lack of competence or capacity to positions they could have not acquired on their own.

 

Other Jordanian ministries and agencies have developed additional codes of conduct to promote values and set standards of ethical behaviour for their public employees.

 

The OECD Joint Learning Study on Jordan “Implementing Codes of Conduct and Ethics in Civil Service” provides analysis on Jordan’s efforts to promote high standards of ethical conduct through the design and implementation of the Code of Conduct; benchmarks Jordan’s Code of Conduct to international standards and practices and proposes options for actions that the Government of Jordan could consider to advance its public officials’ ethical conduct.

 

 

Major Findings of the Study

 

Part I of the Study demonstrates how Jordan’s government can promote a uniform, nationwide Code of conduct and ethics for government officials while simultaneously accommodating an agency’s interest in supplementing the national code to bolster the agency’s specific mission. This Part also documents how Jordan can establish rule-based, enforceable standards of conduct without limiting limit higher ethical standard to which officials ought to aspire.

 

Part II identifies the elements of an effective ethics agency’s structure that can effectively administer the Code of Conduct. Considerations such as independence, consistency of opinions, institutional memory, citizens’ faith and confidence in the integrity of decisions, government officials’ faith and confidence in the integrity of decisions as well as efficiency issues are analysed.  Against this framework of effective administrative structures, Part II measures advantages and disadvantages of lodging administration of the 2006 Code of Conduct in one of Jordan’s existing agencies or in a new agency created expressly for that purpose.  This Part also explains the importance of putting the Code of Conduct on a legal basis.

 

Part III identifies the success factors of an effective Code of Conduct.  Examined in this section are effective strategies for implementing a code; whether an effective code should rely on incentives or punishments or both; challenges for dealing with gifts and favours; declarations of assets and income and a strategy to address potentially conflicting interests before an issue becomes a problem. This Part highlights the importance of the consequences and sanctions of violating the Code of Conduct. It deals also with how to raise awareness of ethical standards through educational programs and how to foster compliance by providing guidance.

 

 

Key proposals for action

 

In order to assist the Government of Jordan to reinforce effective implementation of the 2006 Code of conduct, an analysis of the current system has identified the following six main priorities for future action:

 

§  Establish a concise, uniform, enforceable code of conduct and ethics.

 

§  Choose an administrator of the Code that will provide independence, consistency, and confidence.

 

§  Give the Code a legal basis and procedures for enforcement.

 

§  Permit an official to obtain written advice about the Code’s application.

 

§  Make ethical behaviour a component of periodic performance evaluations that are accompanied by incentives and consequences.

 

§  Foster awareness of the Code’s content through specifically designed educational programmes.

 

For further details, see Part IV of this Study on Proposals for Action.

 

 

 

 

 

SPECIAL APPRECIATION

for

Lessons that Jordan taught the JOINT LEARNING STUDY Review Team

 

Although the primary focus of this report is a review and commentary on Jordan’s creation, administration, and implementation of a code of conduct and ethics for the country’s government officials, a word must be said at the outset about the importance and quality of the joint learning aspects of this Study.

 

Every member of the Joint Learning Review Team was favourably impressed by the dedication, effort, and candour of the officials and government agencies that the Review Team encountered. The Review Team was likewise impressed by the genuine warmth of the Jordanian people – officials of the Kingdom’s government but also taxi drivers, hotel clerks, school children and shopkeepers – who welcomed the Review Team’s members at every opportunity.

 

All of the Joint Learning Study Review Team’s international experts left Jordan with lessons they learned from Jordan’s government during their visit to Amman. Among them:

 

-                Ethical values. The Review Team repeatedly heard from the people it interviewed that Jordan has strong ethical values derived from religious, traditional and cultural foundations. Although the assertion of strong values was always advanced with pride and sincerity and always to highlight the essential goodness of the Jordanian people, sometimes the statement seemed also an assertion that legal or enforceable standards of conduct were unnecessary, unwelcome, or both. The Review Team was reminded that standards of ethical conduct reliant solely upon minimum requirements established by law can create a race to the bottom in which officials seek only to attain minimum legal requirements, instead of aspiring to higher ethical standards appropriate to Jordan’s religious, traditional, and cultural heritage. Other countries, especially western nations, need be aware and appreciate that Jordanians draw on their own ethical heritage to promote value-based integrity programs and need not rely solely on rule-based compliance mechanisms.

 

-                Incentive-based systems. Jordanian Customs presented to the Review Team an incentive-based systems that, as described, seemed to be a well-conceived and effective program for prevent­ing unethical conduct and fostering compliance with ethical standards within Jordanian Customs. The Review Team was impressed by this agency’s system of recognizing and rewarding employees’ ethical behaviour. This approach merits further observation and assessment as a potential model for other Jordanian departments of government and for other nations, western nations included.

 

-                Integrity as an element of periodic performance assessment. Regular review of employees’ and managers’ integrity quotients as an integral portion of perform­ance assessment was a practice that two agencies described to the Review Team. The Review Team encountered these programs, at Jordan’s Food and Drug Administration and at Jordan Customs. The agencies explained that performance assessments gave a clear signal to employees of the conduct that management values and gave management information on which it could award incentives or apply penalties. When linked to objective performance standards, these reviews and their consequences may enhance ethical, competent government service.  These programs impressed the Review Team as programs that additional Jordanian agencies may want to explore and to adopt and as programs that can be transplanted to other countries.

 

-                Ethical standards for regulated professions and businesses. The Joint Learning Study’s Review Team’s international experts were impressed by Jordan’s Food and Drug Administration’s ability to extend its integrity program to organizations that the agency licenses or regulates. Using the power of government to pro­mote ethical best practices among professionals and businesses that govern­ment licenses or regulates is yet another idea that impressed the Joint Learning Study’s Review Team and underscored the significance of the joint learning study aspect.

 

 

Introduction to the Jordanian context

 

Public administration reform in Jordan

 

Efforts to modernize the public sector in Jordan date back to the nineteen seventies. Recent economic reform programs include the Social and Economic Transfor­mation Program of 2002-2004, followed by the Social and Economic Develop­ment Plan in 2004-2006. These reform programs aim at tackling the challenges faced by the Jordanian economy.

 

In order to accompany and strengthen these economic reforms, Jordan launched in 2006 a comprehensive National Reform Agenda “Kuluna al Urdun” that addresses the fight against corruption in all government activities. This National Reform Agenda was completed in 2007 with an Executive Program 2007-2009 that focuses on concrete actions and provides budget allocation to finance them.

 

Under the umbrella of this comprehensive reform strategy of the public administration, other specific measures were introduced in order to enhance integrity in the public sector and make the public sector more effective in delivering the National Reform Agenda:

 

§  The Public Sector Reform Program

 

The Public Sector Reform Program is based on five components, namely 1) Performance Management and Service Delivery Improvement; 2) Institutional Streamlining; 3) Human Resource Management; 4) Financial Management and 5) Management of the Public Sector Reform. The Program aims at enhancing the integrity and effectiveness of Jordan’s public administration.

 

§  The National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008-2012

 

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy aims at reducing engagement in corrupt acts through developing a strong legal and institutional framework.

 

Consequently, the Government of Jordan drafted a new Civil Service Bylaw that defines standards of behaviour in the civil service and contains some components of the Code of Conduct for civil servants.

 

In order to ensure that all these reforms are effectively implemented, Jordan restructured its institutional framework:

 

1. The Ministry of Public Sector Development is responsible for the implementation of the Public Sector Reform Program.

2. The Anti-Corruption Commission verifies the proper implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy.

3. A Government Performance Administration, hosted by Ministry of Public Sector Development will supervise and monitor the government institutions’ performance in meeting their strategic plans and the National Agenda.

4. Other specific units to be created within the Council of Ministers will supervise the implementation of specific measures related to the Public Sector Reform Program.

 

A challenge of the past quarter century has been to sustain the reforms identified (please refer to Box 1). The National Agenda 2006-2015 affords the Kingdom with a well publicized and respected mechanism for realizing a comprehensive, coherent and continuing effort to advance Jordan’s agenda, including the bolstering of standards of conduct and ethics within government.

 

 

Box 1. Jordan’s attempts at public sector reform during last 25 years
1984	Royal Commission for Administrative Reform
1989-1992	administrative development of the public sector in Jordan (UNDP project)
1989-1996	Royal Commission for the renewal and reform
1995	draft of the analysis of service delivery, leadership, and training and the provision of staff in the Ministry of Health (World Bank)
1999	Committee of Public Sector Reform (Phase I)
2002	Committee of Public Sector Reform (Phase II)
1999-2002	Ministry of Administrative Development
2004-2006	Public Sector Development Administration
2006 -	Ministry of Public Sector Development

 

According to H.E. the Minister of Public Sector Development, a Code of Conduct for all public officials is an important first step toward creating a transparent and accountable civil service in order for the citizens as well as for civil servants to have a new perception of the government.

 

 

Wasta in Jordanian society

 

During its mission to Jordan, the JLS Review Team regularly heard references to and stories about wasta. Officially, wasta was uniformly spoken of as a serious problem but also as a tradition and as part of the culture.

 

Even as the Review Team interviewed government officials about their agencies’ missions, challenges, and success and enjoyed candid conversations about standards of conduct for governmental officials, the spectre of wasta was never distant.

 

The Review Team understands “wasta” to refer to one person’s intervention or mediation on behalf of another and to the person who intervenes or mediates. The Review Team also left its mission to Jordan understanding that a wasta’s mediation or settlement of disputes among members of a family or tribe may be a worthy practice. This type of wasta is not the subject of this comment. The problem expressed to the Review Team during its mission was the practice or result of a wasta’s interceding on behalf of a person to secure for the person a right or privilege that the person could not attain on his or her own.

 

Sometimes this intervention is seen as corrective or restorative wasta, an intersession to secure for a person a right that the person was wrongly denied. In the case of a person inappropriately denied a government job or participation in a government program, or admission to a university, the person’s benefactor, or wasta, might use his or her influence to secure for the person the interest wrongly denied. Many people seem to welcome this type of wasta and point to wasta as an important leveler of people in a society in which personal connections trump merit.

 

Wasta’s longevity, in spite of complaints about it, suggests either a cure is not simple or that it is so much part of a tradition that the will to end it is weak. People who might complain with bitterness that the poor state of their affairs is the result of wasta employed by others, may seize upon a wasta to intervene to restore them to a position they imagine to have been unfairly denied them. Wasta breeds wasta. “If others invoke it, then I must too to restore a balance.”

 

For more information on the wasta concept and its origins, please refer to Box 2.

 

 

The Minister of Public Sector Development identified wasta as a main problem of Jordan’s public sector. The Civil Service Bureau reported that wasta plays an important role in employment because Jordanians consider public employment as a very good job opportunity and place a lot of pressure on government to secure or maintain employment. Even so, the Bureau said it is not sure of the extent of the wasta problem because its extent is difficult to assess.

 

The Ombudsman Bureau declared that it could not investigate wasta, saying wasta was within the jurisdiction of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The Bureau stated that it could pursue the claims of people improperly denied employment or promotion, but not pursue improper decisions to grant employment or promotion.

 

What does the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s 2006 Code of Conduct and Ethics say about wasta? According to its Article 10, part A and C:

 

The employee should:

A -- Take actions related to the selection or appointment of staff or upgrading, training, evaluation or reward or transferred or assigned or seconded or any of the matters relating to their work, transparency and absolute impartiality, and free from any considerations of kinship or friendship or utilitarian concepts, and with­out any discrimination building on race or gender, age or religion, by following the foundations of merit and competency and competitiveness, and full compliance with the terms of reference and adopted work procedures.

* * *

C -- Abstain completely, either directly or indirectly, from any preferential treatment to any person through the medium and favouritism.

 

Jordan, like other Arab countries, identifies wasta as a problem for two main reasons:

 

1.            Queue jumping. Wasta permits those privileged by connections to go to the front of the line, passing ahead of others who are equally or more deserving. This is seen as unjust by competent men and women denied a job or a place in a university.

2.            Lack of competence or capacity. The hire, promotion, or retention of a government official incompetent for the job (or a university’s accommodation of a bad student) is also recognized as unjust.

 

The foregoing examples may be examples of unjust wasta that may undermine confidence in the institution affected. However, the second example does more damage. Not only is there harm to citizens’ faith and confidence in the institution acceding to the wasta, but the institution is then also burdened with an incompetent, inefficient, underperforming employee (or student).

 

Even if a government were unconcerned by the exercise of privilege that merely permits the well-connected to skip to the head of the queue of likewise competent individuals, any government has reason to be bothered by a system that substitutes incompetents for the nation’s best.

 

 

Jordan has a population of more than 6,000,000. Educating, policing, and prosecuting individuals for using wasta might seem like sweeping the sands of the desert. It is easy to conclude that there are too many people and too little capacity to address the employment of wasta at the level of individual citizens. Government might find it far more efficient to combat wasta at the level of government ministry or agency. Wasta does not succeed if a ministry refuses to play the game. If the agency relies solely on transparent, merit-based selection processes, wasta ends there. It is certainly more efficient to bring the enforcement to a few dozen departments than to 6,000,000 people.

 

The Civil Service Bureau said that it tried to launch a pilot project to control wasta in the Ministry of Education, but the project was postponed because of cultural resistance, lack of political will, lack of mindset, and lack of human resources professionalism.

 

If competency, efficiency, and attributes of job performance are dealt with regularly and honestly, then the most egregious consequences can effectively be dealt with as part of the personnel system. After all, there are in this world many effective businesses and governments that rely heavily on family connections. They succeed when they also insist upon competence. This approach does not address the “fairness” argument, which can be of substantial importance, but it is a step toward dealing with the most pernicious effects of wasta.

 

Remark

 

The government’s sorting out whether wasta is most appropriately characterized as a problem of corruption, competence, fairness or something else, will help the government plan its strategies for dealing with the matter as personnel, administrative, anti-corruption, or ethical issues. Possibilities that Jordan may consider to control wasta include:

 

§  Adopt and enforce an anti-nepotism law.

§  Insist upon the competency, good performance and efficiency of government officials, by using all the tools of modern personnel management, including recruitment and selection of employees according to merit, periodic personnel evaluation, and significant incentives and penalties to reward and to correct behaviours.

§  Encourage employment of competent, efficient members of families, tribes, or people underrepresented in an agency’s workforce and who do not rely on wasta to secure employment.

§  Forbid a government official to act at the behest of a wasta.

§  Make the wasta the guarantor of his client, that is, shun a wasta who pushes incompetent clients or meritless causes.

 

 

 

 

Part I. Code of conduct and ethics

 

 

A.      A uniform code or multiple codes?

 

Jordan’s many ministries and agencies are embarked upon different public integrity programs. Some have put a measure of reliance upon the Code of Conduct and Ethics for Career Public Office (“Code of Conduct”) adopted by the Ministry of Public Sector Development during 2006. Some have embraced all or some elements of that code while implementing additional agency specific stan­dards. Some agencies have been unaware of the Code of Conduct that the Ministry of Public Sector adopted.

 

Some point to forces working against a code of conduct and ethics. A representative of the Civil Service Bureau told the Review Team that the 2006 code of conduct has not been properly implemented. Indeed, the Ministry of Public Sector Development volunteered that of 25 ministries asked to comment on the draft code, only 8 supplied feedback. A representative of the Audit Bureau explained that the Ministry of Public Sector Development has not received feedback about its code because the code has not been culturally accepted, adding that there is no punishment of “bad ethical behaviour”. The Civil Service Bureau’s spokesperson added that Jordanian public administration comprises very traditional institutions that consider that they already possess important values like Islamic values and family values and do not require a code of conduct. In fact, said this representative, a national code is not needed and the idea of a national code is a donor suggestion copied from international methodologies without appropriate verification how it could be applied in Jordan. Others interviewed believed that provisions within the 2006 code of conduct, such as those that prohibited strikes and restricted Internet, use diminished broader acceptance of the code.

 

In a different vein, a representative of the Anti-Corruption Commission told the Review Team that a code of conduct is a national need that should be in line with international practices and merits collaboration with the international community. The National Center for Human Rights affirmed this view, saying that a national code of conduct is needed, not only for state employees’ responsibilities, but also their rights, all in line with international standards.

 

Other agencies have chartered their own courses, implementing their own integrity programs, independent of the actions of other agencies.

 

Options considered:

 

1.             A uniform, nationwide code of ethical conduct

Advantages:       All public servants should be guided by the same core principles and values. A common code:

§ Facilitates awareness and education programs for public officials.

§ Facilitates citizens’ common expectations for government officials.

 

2.        Specific code of conduct for each agency tailored to the agency’s business needs

Advantages:       An agency may establish rules and expectations for addressing situations encountered uniquely in that agency

Disadvantage:   Different standards in each agency undermine officials’ and citizens’ confidence in appropriateness of the standards that are higher, lower, or different from standards of another agency. A patchwork of different codes makes education, understanding, and enforcement complicated, expensive, and maybe even impossible.

 

Being newly established, the Ombudsman Bureau has not developed its own code of conduct. Representatives of the Ombudsman Bureau said that it would establish its own code because the Bureau must lead by example if it is to convince other civil servants to avoid misconduct.

 

The Audit Bureau has its own code of conduct for its employees that – according to these employees – is more strict and detailed than the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s Code of Conduct. The code bans an auditor’s receipt of gifts and meals. An employee must read and sign the Bureau’s code.

 

The Civil Service Bureau told the Review Team that because each institution has its own code of conduct and that institutions do not want a national code that will not address the institutions’ specific needs.

 

The Anti-Corruption Commission reported that it is preparing its own code of conduct, which it plans to deploy during 2009. The Commission recognizes that, to set a good example of public administration of ethical standards, the code of conduct it creates for itself must be a good example for other institutions. The Commission said it preferred to have its own code of conduct rather than to rely on the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s Code of Conduct, because the Commission’s code will more specifically address the Commission’s needs.

 

For its part, the Government Tender Directorate stated that it does not have its own code of conduct but that, in coordination with all procurement departments, it will develop a code of conduct for the procurement profession.

 

3.        A uniform, nationwide code of ethical conduct supported in limited discrete efforts, if needed, by an agency’s additions to address the agency’s additional business needs

Advantages:       This approach provides the advantages of a uniform, nationwide code, but acknowledges that an agency may supplement the national code with additional standards to address its unique business needs with provisions not antagonistic to the uniform code.

 

Even though the Government Tender Directorate intends to develop a code of conduct for the procurement profession, it told the Review Team that a code of conduct should include two parts: a general code applicable to all civil servants and a code specific to each institution.

 

The Ministry of Finance said that it developed its own code of conduct based upon the Ministry’s vision of focusing on good financial management. The Ministry reports that it follows both its own code and the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s Code of Conduct, saying that the Ministry’s code is consistent with this latter national code.

 

During the meeting with the National Committee, the Review Team was told: “We should develop a code of conduct with two parts: a general code for the entire civil service and a specific code for each institution tailored to the institution’s work.”

 

Saying that it needs to acquire more experience before deciding whether Jordan should develop a uniform, national code of conduct or several codes, a senior official of the Ombudsman Bureau, ventured that a uniform code of conduct seemed to be important.

 

In 2006, the Ministry of Public Sector Development sent its newly developed Code of Conduct to all government agencies and asked them to implement it. The Ministry now recognizes that each institution may develop its own code.

 

Remark

 

Although all countries at all times might reasonably allow for differences in the issues, circumstances, and problems that different agencies confront, the challenge to Jordan’s government is to identify a brief statement of core values that will promote a uniform, nationwide code of conduct and ethics for government officials. Where necessary to the unique mission of an agency, that agency could supplement the uniform code. By this approach, Jordan might find efficiencies in creating public awareness, educating government officials, advising officials about the code’s application to specific circumstances, investigating possible violations of the code, and securing enforcement, while still permitting each agency to supplement the uniform code with additional standards specific to the agency’s work and risks.

 

 

 

B.      Value or rule based standards?

 

During the field mission in Jordan, the Review Team often heard that Jordan’s religious and cultural values and traditions provide the country and its citizens with a strong base of honesty and integrity, which should be maintained and fostered. At the same time, many talked to the Review Team of wasta, which they also described as a traditional custom, but one that undermined government’s competency and efficiency. This section addresses the two different approaches of code of conducts, namely the value-based and the rule-based options. 

 

Options considered:

 

1.       Rely solely on a value-based code of conduct and ethics

Throughout its mission to Jordan, the Joint Learning Study Review Team heard about the importance that religion and culture play in producing in Jordan a culture that discourages the pay­ment or acceptance of bribes or other forms of corrupt behaviour. Some told the Review Team of the importance of an aspirational, value-based code that exhorts pub­lic officials to higher standards. The point was made that in rule-based systems of western countries, an official may seek to meet only the minimum standard required and not strive to attain a higher standard of ethics that traditional Jordanian values might inspire. Not always said was that traditional values comprise wasta, which, as practiced, may exalt connections over competency.

 

2.       Establish rule-based code of conduct and ethics that establishes expectations for public service

Jordanian officials noted that without established rules of behaviour for officials, managers cannot effectively manage their employees. If there are no rules, there are no consequences.

 

3.       Values and rules

The combination of values and rules encourages higher principles of ethics and conduct by inspiring government officials practice the highest levels of service and simultaneously establish and enforce uniform expectations for government service, which, if violated, will result in a consequence or penalty.

 

Among the many institutions with which the Review Team met, the Jordan Food and Drug Administration was very direct in declaring that its Good Governance for Medicine Program combines a values based approach and discipline.

 

Remark

 

The government does not need to choose between a value-based and a rule-based system. Jordan’s challenge is to determine the degree to which its government can successfully invoke traditional Jordanian values to spur officials to realize the highest standards of service, efficiency, and ethics in one hand; while simultaneously establishing rule-based standards of conduct and ethics that a government official must meet or exceed in order to avoid unpleasant consequences in the other hand.

 

 

 

C.      Detailed code of conduct or generally stated ethics standards?

 

Every government that sets out to write a code of conduct and ethical standards confronts the tension between a detailed code to address all the known risks and a more general statement of principles. This section explores that tension.

 

Options considered:

 

1.       Enactment of a detailed code of conduct and ethics

Most people would agree that, for any standard to be effective, the standard must be clear and readily understood by the people to whom it applies. The code of conduct should provide the following virtues to guide the drafter: precision, completeness, and clarity.

 

However, the pursuit of these virtues often goes astray.

 

a.        The attempt to be precise often initially leads drafters to set out standards with great detail. The quest for precision often leads to the meaning of each word, which leads to definitions, which in their own quest to be precise, adds to the number of words and length of the document.

b.        The attempt to be complete leads drafters to undertake exhaustive lists of all situations that might arise, or at least as many as can be imagined.

c.         In order for the code’s meaning to be clear and understandable, a drafter is frequently lured into restating a point in multiple ways.

 

A consequence of pursuing a precise, complete, understandable code of conduct can be a code that is too long and complicated to remember, so detailed that it incorporates inconsistent provisions or definitions, and so bound to specific circumstances that it fails to account for emerging technologies and novel situations.

 

To this point, nothing said in this section is limited to Jordan. The foregoing considerations might be relevant in any place at any time. Yet, Jordan’s effort to establish a code of conduct illustrates these pitfalls.

 

The current text of the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s Code of Conduct – perhaps for historical reasons pertinent in 2006, the time of its creation – is arguably unnecessarily encumbered with provisions that may safely be omitted or transferred elsewhere. Article 11, for example is largely addressed at ordinary work habits such as turning off a computer when it is not in use and use of email and the internet. At the time that the Ministry of Public Sector Development established this text, comput­ers, email, and the internet were more likely to be novelties than they are today. The detail of Article 11 may have been welcome at the time, but as computers have become a common element of the workplace, they no longer require the special attention to detail that the Code of Conduct provides.

 

The United Nations International Code of Conduct for Public Officials[3] addresses the matter the following way:

 

“Public officials shall at no time improperly use public mon­eys, property, services or information that is acquired in the performance of, or as a result of, their official duties for activities not related to their official work”.

 

Remark

 

Jordan’s code might address computers, telephones, photocopiers, even automobiles, and other government devices along these lines:

 

A govern­ment official should not use government facilities, supplies, or resources for the private advantage of the official, the official’s immediate family, or a business or organization with which the official is associated.

 

 

2.        Enactment of a code of conduct and ethics expressed in general principles

 

The experience of many jurisdictions is that a code of conduct and ethics comprising a short, concise statement of principles and standards is more effective, better accepted by the officials to whom it applies, more readily understood, more easily enforced, and less susceptible to internal contra­dictions, than is a lengthy, complicated code that attempts to address every situation that might arise.

 

Remark

 

The entire text of the model code advanced by the United Nations occupies only about one page of text, and offers a good model for the brevity against which Jordan might assess any code.

 

 

3.    Intrusion of extraneous, but important issues

 

Any country’s attempt to articulate standards of conduct may occasionally stray from the principal mission by incorporating items best left to a different vehicle. Jordan’s effort is not immune.

 

Included in Article 5, part G of the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s Code of Conduct’s text is this provision: “The employee should:

 

G -- Non-strike action, or inciting others, and refrain from organizing petitions collective job-related or participate in the organization, whatever the reasons and motives are, and commitment in ways that appeal to be followed.”

 

Whatever its merits in terms of Jordan’s labour laws, the section is not appropriately part of an ethical code. It unnecessarily burdens the Code of Conduct with provisions that distract from its main objectives and make the Code of Conduct’s acceptance, implementation, and enforcement more diffi­cult than it would otherwise be. Indeed, the National Center for Human Rights said that its main criticism of the 2006 proposed national Code of Conduct was its restraints on free speech and participation in strikes.

 

Remark

 

For maximum effectiveness of its code of conduct and ethics, Jordan may consider to what extent it can:

-- limit the Code of Conduct to an easily read, easily understood, easily remembered, easily applied and concise statement of enforceable ethical standards that

-- excludes references to strikes, internet and email use, and work rules unrelated to ethical standards.

 

 

 

D.      Retain, modify, or re-write current code? The merits of consultation with stakeholders.

 

The “Code of Conduct and Ethics for Career Public Office” that the Ministry of Public Sector Development created in 2006 establishes a good base from which to advance Jordan’s governmental integrity program. Inclusion of stakeholders in its refinement might improve the Code of Conduct’s content and acceptance.

 

Options considered:

 

1.       Maintain the Code of Conduct that the Ministry of Public Sector Development adopted in 2006 as it is

 

2.       Edit the Code of Conduct to make it more concise (for example, delete portion concerning internet, human rights, and strikes)

 

3.       Adopt an international model code of conducts, such as the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations [Annex C], and make it coherent with Jordanian values

 

4.       Re-begin the drafting of a code of conduct and ethics.

 

Jordan is well on its way toward an effective code of conduct and ethics. There is no compelling reason to start from scratch. Jordan may be well advised to look to additional models such as the United Nations’ model code [see Annex C], or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s Conduct Standards for Public Officials [See Annex D], among others. Jordan can readily build upon the Code of Conduct it has already established, pruning it to make it more concise and to eliminate less relevant portions.

 

The International Code of Conduct for Public Officials adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations offers a very good baseline or starting point for Jordan’s Code of Conduct and Ethics.  It offers simplicity, brevity, and clarity.  Jordan might well adopt this model code and build upon it to account for Jordanian values and issues unique to Jordan and its culture. 

 

The Joint Learning Study’s Review Team considered whether and to what extent the government should involve a variety of stakeholders, including news media, busi­ness, commerce, academia, and others to assist with the Code of Conduct’s refinement. Inclusion of stakeholders offers the possibility that the stakeholders will improve and refine the Code of Conduct in important ways that would not occur if they are excluded. Moreover, involvement of stakeholders may cause them to become important and effective allies who will be helpful to the Code of Conduct’s implementation process. Including nongovernmental stakeholders may accelerate the Code of Conduct’s revision. However, the consultation may also require additional delays and therefore impede the revision.

 

In order to realize a positive result, everyone consulted should approach the task with goodwill and arrive with open minds prepared to listen to others and to alter their views to accommodate valid concerns of others. Moreover, various businesses and NGOs may arrive with their own agendas that are not entirely in harmony with the advancement of citizens’ well-placed confidence in government. In other words, inclusion of a variety of stakeholders can be a significant device to derive a solid code of conduct and for its implementation, but care must be taken in the selection of the voices invited to the table.

 

The importance of engaging the civil society in preparation of a national Code of Conduct was advanced, amongst others, by the National Center for Human Rights. The Center reported that it has a comprehensive list of NGO’s in Jordan and has an opinion about which should be involved. According to the Center, drafting of a national Code of Conduct should include consultation with labour unions, women’s organizations; NGO’s working towards integrity and access to information, and the National Center for Human Rights itself.

 

Remark

 

Jordan may proceed to build upon the existing Code of Conduct by making it more concise and borrowing, where appropriate, provisions from the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and other examples of international best practice.

 

Alternatively, Jordan might employ the UN model as a baseline or starting point for Jordan’s Code of Conduct and Ethics and build upon it by incorporating provisions that account for Jordanian values and issues unique to Jordan’s culture. 

 

The government could consider and make a determination about whether it can improve the Code of Conduct’s provisions, public acceptance, implementation and effectiveness, by including a variety of stakeholders in this process.

 

 

 

Part II. Administrative structure and legal basis

 

 

 

A.      Components and considerations for a successful administrative structure

 

No code of conduct, no matter how good and appropriate its words, can be effective without a well-designed administrative structure to implement it. This section identifies some of the consideration for which the government may account in designing its preferred system.

 

1.     Independence and freedom from governmental and political entanglements

 

How the individual or body charged with administering the country’s Code of Conduct can establish itself in citizens’ minds as an independent, fair-minded, referee of officials’ actions?

 

During the Review Team’s mission to Jordan, the Anti-Corruption Commission reminded the team that the UNCAC emphasizes the need to establish an independent body responsible for fighting corruption. Consequently, H.E. the King had established the Commission as an independent body to complete this task in a systematic, institutional way. The same need can be expressed about the administration of a Code of Conduct. To some extent, the administrator of the nation’s Code of Conduct is the official charged with assuring that all the actors play fair and within the rules. If a government official, in violation of the rules, uses his or her position to obtain a benefit for the official or for the official’s family, then the responsibility of the administrator of the Code of Conduct is to issue a caution or exact a penalty.

 

Options considered:

 

a.  An individual of sterling reputation

     One approach is for the government to designate as administrator of the Code of Conduct an individual beyond reproach, a person recognized throughout government and the citizenry as fair, honest, and independent.

 

b.   An independent, nonpartisan, citizen body

       In this model, a board or commission oversees the Code of Conduct’s administration and no member of the governing body may be a member of a political faction or hold any other position in government. The aim is to identify and appoint to the commission citizens of impeccable reputations and credentials, widely recognized as incorruptible, often of varied professional and experiential backgrounds, and placing national interest before any other.

 

c.   A body of balanced interests

       A third approach, which various governments have used, is to designate a governing board or commission of which no more than one-half of the members may be adherents of one political party or faction. Provisions of this type are established to assure that the board or commission will be fair and balanced and that a single political faction will not control the commission’s work. Commissions of this type have often been successful, but they are not without concerns. That is because an ethics commission divided along political lines can undermine citizens’ confidence in the system, if the commission’s members vote along party lines. That result signals to citizens that commissioners are acting in furtherance of political interests, not national interests, and erode the public’s confidence in the body and in government.

 

Even, in jurisdictions which require participation of various factions on a commission, it has been observed that the factions have sometimes conspired with each other to protect their mutual political interests and defend the practices, even inappropriate or illegal practices, of government officials from reform from the outside. Ultimately, the effectiveness of any body is dependent upon the character of its individual members.

 

2.       Institutional memory – appointment for staggered terms

 

As we look to the future, how can anyone provide for consistent application of ethical standards over time? To be consistent in the future, one must have a memory of the past. A Minister’s governmental memory may go back no further than the start of his or her appointment. A way to promote consistency of actions over time is to provide for institutional memory. A method for creating institutional memory is to designate a commission or governing board of members with staggered terms.

 

Because it has multiple mem­bers, a board’s or commission’s memory can reach back as far as it’s longest serving member, but this is of little assistance if a new government replaces all the commissioners at the same time. Therefore, Jordan’s government might consider placing responsibility for the direction of the code of conduct and ethics with a body whose members’ terms expire at different times. The possibilities are many and include: a 5, 6, or 7 member body, each member appointed for a 5-, 6-, or 7-year term, one term expiring each year or a 6 or 8 member body with 2 terms expiring each year.

 

This approach has the benefit of imbuing an agency’s policymakers with institutional memory, and protects against a sudden shift of interpretation, all the while allowing for a slow, constant renewal of vigour by the replacement of members over time.

 

3.       Number of members of a governing board or commission

 

If Jordan were to entrust administration of the code of conduct and ethics to a part-time board or full-time commission, some people might immediately conclude that the number of mem­bers would be better to be odd in order to avoid a tie vote. That may be the better course, but other thoughtful observes argue forcefully that an important issue of government conduct should not be decided by the vote of a single member of a deeply divided membership and that an even number of members leads to better, collegial decision-making and consistency of decisions over time. What does a closely divided vote, for example, 4 to 3 or 5 to 4, signal to citizens and to government officials? Does such a vote indicate that the difference between right and wrong was so close? Such a grey area, that reasonable people can disagree about it? That there is not a specific correct answer? That even a well-intentioned government official trying to follow the rules, can be second guessed by a tribunal whose members do not agree upon the correct answer? Might a matter decided so narrowly on one occasion, be decide differently the next time, signalling to officials and to citizens that ethical values are always changing or debatable?

 

Some governments have avoided or mitigated the mischief occasioned by the closely divided vote by insisting upon a requirement that a decision be taken only by a supermajority of votes, for example, 4 of 6 or 5 of 7.

 

The argument is that a requirement for a supermajority vote increases collaboration, enhances both the quality of the decision and citizens’ and officials’ acceptance of it, and establishes strong precedents to guide the code of conduct’s future application.

 

4.       Compensation and length of administrator’s term

 

There is a thought that employees of an institution charged with administration of a code of conduct and ethics should be well paid because they will then not be susceptible to receiving gifts or favours that will sway the their actions. The argument is made regardless of whether the body is headed by an individual or a full-time commission. The counter argument is that a well-paid administrator will be reluctant to decide any matter con­trary to the desire of the appointing authority so as not to jeopardize his or her appointment to the lucrative possession.

 

The fairness and independence of an administrator’s decisions are subject to undue influence if the administrator’s financial well-being is dependent upon making decisions favourable to his or her appointing authority. To address this, the Review Team has identified alternatives.

 

One solution is to designate the authority, either an individual or a member of a paid commission, to a fixed term of office with no possibility of re-appointment. In this manner, the person is free to act without his or her finances being affected.

 

Another solution is to designate a part-time, unpaid board of citizens to designate the full-time administrator and to oversee operation of the institution. Part-time board members paid expenses, and perhaps a modest per diem, may be freer to act appropriately because they will not be dependent upon a government official or officials for the job.

 

It might be said that, as a referee of governmental officials’ actions, the overseeing board of a code of conduct and ethics should undertake the post as a civic responsibility, not as government’s financial dependent -- just as the per­son officiating a football match should not be paid by either team.

 

Remark

 

Jordan’s government might weigh the importance of [i] continuity and consistency of the code’s application and [ii] securing confidence in the code’s administration and then select mechanisms that will further the goals identified.

 

 

 

B.       Review of possible administrative structures

 

This section identifies and reviews several options for administrative responsibility for Jordan’s Code of Conduct.

 

Options considered

 

Code of Conduct administration by:

 

§    Ministry of Public Sector Development, in particular, through its Human Resources Department

§    Anti-Corruption Commission or other existing department or agency

§    The National Committee of departments as currently constituted

§    A National Committee with expanded or modified membership

§    A commission or board of citizen members

-          An independent, stand-alone commission or board

-          A commission or board attached to another institution for administrative purposes

 

1. Ministry of Public Sector Development

 

The Ministry for Public Sector Development could be a natural and appropriate choice for being responsible for the implementation of Code of Conduct. The Ministry has background in this area and has taken a leadership role. During the Joint Learning Study’s mission to Jordan, the Minister, the interim Secretary General, and the Secretary General appointed during the Review Team’s visit all voiced their support for and commitment to the effective implementation of a code of conduct and ethics. The Ministry has created a Human Resources Management unit that that could be charged with implementation of the Code of Conduct if responsibility for administering the Code is assigned to the Ministry. Moreover, because the Ministry contains the National Institute of Training, it could be ideally situated to create and to deliver education about the substance of the code of conduct and ethics and also about the procedures for its implementation and enforcement. [See more about education at paragraph III, D].

 

Some interviewees, in particular the Government Tender Directorate, told the Review Team that the Ministry of Public Sector Development, acting through the National Committee, is the institution most appropriate for implementing a national code of conduct. The National Centre for Human Rights told the Review Team that the Ministry for Public Sector development could be the main institution in charge of implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethics, but that the Ministry has to coordinate with other institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, Civil Service Bureau, and the Ministry of Justice.

 

Although the present configuration of individuals in place at the Ministry may be ideally suited to implementation of the Code of Conduct, The Joint Learning Study Review Team raises a caution about the continuity of the Code of Conduct application over time. During its mission to Jordan, various officials reminded the Review Team that leadership of a ministry changes from time to time. As leadership changes, sometimes the priorities of a ministry change. The Review Team was advised that since 2006, different levels of commitment to the standards of conduct and ethics project were perceived in the Ministry. More than one Jordanian official reminded the Review Team that the history of a Ministry is the tenure of the current minister. In spite of the competence, interest, desire, and dedication of the current Minister and her key officials, the government must account for the long-term efficacy of the program if it places its administration in this ministry.

 

2. Anti-Corruption Commission or other existing department or agency

 

If Jordan’s government considers placing responsibility for administering the Code of Conduct in any agency other that the Ministry of Public Sector Development, the Anti-Corruption Commission might be a candidate. The Commission was created in 2006 to fight corruption in a systematic, institutional way and began its work effectively during 2008. At the time of the Review Team’s visit, the Commission reported that it had received 538 cases and that of these had transferred 116 to the judiciary, mainly cases of embezzlement, bribery, and fraud. The Commission heads a national committee to assure implementation of the UNCAC. The committee includes representatives of the Human Rights Center, money-laundering unit of the Central Bank, General Intelligence Services, and the Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Public Sector Development. The Anti-Corruption Commission has an interest in promoting good government.

 

In spite of the reasons why the code of conduct and standards might be combined with the work of the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Commission was very clear to the Review Team that, at present, the Commission is already straining to complete well the assignments already given it. The Commission did not express any interest in expanding its jurisdiction or authority and indicated that it is not presently equipped to add more to its responsibilities.

 

When asked about this, the Commission answered that because the Civil Service Bureau is well established and has long experience, that Bureau is the ideal institution to implement a national code of conduct – in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Sector Development and the National Committee. The Ombudsman Bureau, too, voiced the opinion that the Civil Service Bureau would be in a good position to be in charge of a national code of conduct.

 

3. National Committee with current or revised membership

 

A national committee of agen­cies to work with the administrator on education, compliance, and enforce­ment matters can be extremely helpful. These considerations provide ample reason to continue or to build upon the National Committee to further develop the substance and implementation of the Code of Conduct. The Audit Bureau stated that the Audit Bureau and the Anti-Corruption Commission work together closely to address corruption, the Anti-Corruption Commission relying on the Audit Bureau’s expertise, but those efforts within the civil service to coordinate anti-corruption efforts are not sufficient.

 

During its mission to Jordan in March 2009, officials explained to the Joint Learning Study Review Team that the National Committee was established only two weeks before the Review Team’s arrival. The National Committee is too new to permit an evaluation of its effectiveness is what the Government Tender Directorate, as an important member of the National Committee, told the Review Team.

 

Other agencies the involvement of which it was suggested to the Review Team would be valuable were the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Justice, and Central Bank. The Review Team did not meet with representatives of the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Justice, or Central Bank and so offers no assessment of the value of their inclusion in the National Committee.

 

In any event, effective implementation of standards of conduct and ethics requires a single source of guidance on integrity issues. If there is shared responsibility for the program, there is no responsibility. The code’s implementation can unlikely be successful if its administra­tion is lodged with a committee of agencies.

 

Nevertheless, a National Committee could be helpful to the Code of Conduct’s administrator and to the Code of Conduct’s success were such a committee charged with specific tasks such as fostering fluid communication among government agencies, quality control for education programs, and both direction from the Code of Conduct’s administrator and feedback to the administrator on the code’s successes and shortcomings.

 

4. A new board or commission of citizens

 

This option could provide two different ways to implement: [a] creation of a new board or commission, or [b] attaching a part-time board to an existing institution.

 

A new and independent board or commission. Each of the institutions already identified – the Ministry of Public Sector Development, Anti-Corruption Commission, National Committee – and other institutions of Jordan’s government have responsibilities unrelated to administration of a Code of Conduct. They were designed for other purposes. Just as Jordan found it appropriate to create the Anti-Corruption Commission to take on its new, important duties, the implementation of the Code of Conduct offers Jordan an opportunity to design an institution that accounts for the principles of independence and institutional memory discussed in the prior section.

 

A new and independent board or commission attached to an existing institution. Although there may be compelling reasons for creating a new entity to administer the Code of Conduct, there are always arguments for improving government operations by consolidating government functions and institutions. Jordan might also consider establishing a part-time board or full-time commission to oversee the implementation and administration of the Code of Conduct and rely on the professional staff of an existing institution to implement the Code of Conduct. In this way, Jordan can give the Code of Conduct a high degree of prominence, equip it with institutional memory and independence, and give it the professional services and administrative support of an existing institution without creating a new bureaucracy. There are many possibilities to be considered. The approach described here is not presented as a recommendation, but as an illustration of one possibility. For instance, the Government of Jordan could consider designate a part-time board of citizens of sterling reputation and national respect with authority to oversee the implementation of the Code of Conduct. Attach the board, for administrative support, to the Ministry of Public Sector Development. Under the board’s supervision, use the Ministry’s existing staff to implement the Code of Conduct and the National Institute of Training to design and deliver education programs about the Code of Conduct. Continue the National Committee to address institutions’ complementary and overlapping responsibilities for audit, citizen complaints, investigations, enforcement, employee education, interpretation, and application of the Code of Conduct.

 

Remark

 

Jordan has many reasonable options for situating authority for administration of the nation’s code of conduct and ethics. The Study offers arguments for several choices. In deciding among the options, Jordan will do well to select a mechanism that affords:

 

-- Consistency of opinions;

-- Institutional memory consistency of opinions;

-- Citizens’ faith and confidence in the integrity of decisions;

-- Government officials’ faith and confidence in the integrity of decisions;

-- Economy and efficiency.

 

 

 

C. A legal basis for a uniform code of conduct and ethics and harmonizing it with other laws

 

1.    Merits of a legal basis

 

Options considered:

 

Option 1: If the Code of Conduct is based in law, it:	Option 2: If the Code of Conduct is not based in law:
§  Commands respect	§  It may command less respect
§  Promotes compliance	§  Enforcement may be difficult
§  Can be enforced	§  Compliance may be compromised
§  If legislative, requires review and agreement of both houses of parliament for modification	§  It can be changed easily, frequently, and without careful review of the change or its consequence
§  Is difficult to change

 

It was evident to the Review Team that the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s 2006 attempt to establish a national Code of Conduct does not command the respect of all the ministries and institutions. Some ministries were unaware of the Code of Conduct. At least one said the Code of Conduct was unnecessary. Less than one-third even answered the Ministry of Public Sector Development’s request for comments about the draft Code of Conduct.

 

Why should the other ministries care? Each has its own mission and priorities. The Code of Conduct is not a law they are obliged to follow. The importance of giving the Code of Conduct a legal underpinning was reinforced by the National Institute for Training’s telling the Review Team that although it could design an educational program about the Code of Conduct, officials must have a reason to learn. Why should an official attend such a course, if failure to understand and follow the Code of Conduct has no consequence? The Audit Bureau made it clear that for a law to have respect it must be enforced. To be enforced, it must be enforceable. In the views of the Anti-Corruption Commission, a Code of Conduct should have supporting legislation in order to be effective.

 

2.       Harmonizing a code of conduct and ethics with other laws

 

If Jordan legislates the national Code of Conduct, attention must be paid to addressing any existing bylaw, decree, administrative rule, or practice antagonistic to the national Code of Conduct.

 

In the absence of this precaution, a patchwork of bylaws, policies, and practices has grown by introducing a legislated national Code of Conduct. Unless the government properly addresses the situation, legislation establishing a national, uniform Code of Conduct runs the risk of encountering conflicts with policies and practices already in place. The trick is to substitute for the patchwork of provisions now in place, one seamless fabric of law[4].

 

Remark

 

Jordan’s government will decide the degree of prominence and respect it will assign to a Code of Conduct and whether the Code of Conduct’s provisions will be enforceable. The Code of Conduct is to have stature and consequence, then it is likely that the government will consider giving it a legal basis.

 

If Jordan implements the Code of Conduct by adoption of legislation or other mechanism that establishes the Code of Conduct as the nation’s law, then Jordan may avoid conflicts and antagonisms within the law by repealing or addressing other provisions and practices that would erode the Code of Conduct’s authority.

 

 

 

Part III. Effective administration of a Code of Conduct

 

A.      Should implementation be phased in? If so, how?

 

The Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics might apply to as many as 187,000 employees. There is good reason to apply the Code of Conduct and Ethics to all of them, but the number of employees may strain the capacity of government to create awareness, educate, and address questions of implementation and compliance for all of them simultaneously.

 

Options considered:

 

1.             Apply the Code of Conduct first to senior officials

Throughout the world, experience demonstrates that successful implementation of standards of conduct and ethics depends upon leadership from the top. If the Code of Conduct is phased in from the top, several benefits could be encountered, including:

 

-          Senior officials will have knowledge of and experience with the standards before the managers are obliged to implement the Code of Conduct among the employees that they supervise. This preparation will facilitate its implementation.

-          Employees will readily see that management is serious about the Code of Conduct. A Code of Conduct is likely to fail if employees believe that the Code is only for junior workers, not the senior managers.

-          The first months and year of implementation are likely to bring to light many questions about the Code of Conduct’s application and interpretation that could readily not have been foreseen. Applica­tion of the Code of Conduct first to senior officials will afford the administering agency a test group on which to assess the Code of Conduct’s application to real-life situations and permit the agency to address unforeseen matters, to improve educational materials and devices, and to improve processes for the Code of Conduct’s implementation, before rolling out the standards to all officials.

 

2.             Apply code to all officials simultaneously

This approach sends the message that observance of the Code of Conduct is important for all public officials. The downside is that simultaneous application to all offi­cials could easily swamp the country’s capacity to educate everyone adequately about the Code of Conduct’s provision. If this option is selected, it may be prudent to announce a delayed implementation date, perhaps six months in the future, preceded by an aggressive half year education campaign to educate officials about the  Code of Conduct’s requirements and processes prior to implementation.

 

On a cautionary note, the first months and year of implementation are sure to bring to light many questions about the Code of Conduct’s application and interpretation that could not have been foreseen. During this period, people will naturally challenge some of the Code of Conduct’s provisions and test the implementation and enforcement mechanisms. This is always a critical stage for an administering body. Jordan’s challenge will be great if the challenge comes simultaneously from 187,000 officials.

 

3.             Phase in the code’s application agency by agency

For the reasons already offered, a phased approach has advantages. The Review Team found support for this approach from the National Committee where the Team heard that because socio-economic factors may push civil servants to be corrupted, it may be important to begin applying a code of conduct in institutions that deal directly with public funds.

 

On the other hand, a phase-in by agency lacks the advantage of equipping senior officials with experience with the Code of Conduct prior to their applying it to their own em­ployees and lacks the important symbol of senior management’s buy-in before application to less senior employees. Phase-in by agency also has the potential to create antagonisms between agencies or employ­ees of different agencies because of an impression that one agency was selected to precede another because the agency was more important or was “better” and could set a good example or was “worse” and needed correction by implementation of the code.

 

Remark

 

Although all the foregoing options are reasonable, the best method for Jordan will emerge from Jordan’s own assessment of [i] how rapidly its capacities will permit it to educate its officials about the code and to address the many, practical issues about application and processes that will naturally arise and [ii] its ability to enlist the support of senior officials.

 

 

 

B.      Incentive-based programs

 

During its mission to Jordan, the Joint Learning Study Review Team heard it suggested that a Code of Conduct and standards are not to be administered solely by punitive measures to punish inappropriate behaviour, but also by offering encouragements to better behaviour. During the Review Team’s first day of visits, a member of the National Committee told the team that the national Code of Conduct should concentrate more on incentives rather than punishments. In addition, each institution may develop its own incentives.

 

The Review Team learned that several institutions employ incentive systems. The Government Tender Directorate told the Team that it employs an incentive system for its employees that, in addition to recognizing work performance, might be adapted to reward ethical actions.

 

In order to implement its code of conduct, the Jordan Food and Drug Administration said that it has designed incentives, such as a financial award to a person designated the “employee of the month.” The Ministry of Finance, too, said that it has a multi-incentive system.

 

Jordan Customs reported that it has the capacity to offer to its employees performance incentives that might include costs of Hajj, free training in Eng­lish, financial assistance in the form of a loan up to 30,000 Jordan Dinars (JOD)[5]. The avail­ability of incentives to an employee is dependent upon successful perform­ance reviews that take ethical behaviour into account. The Joint Learning Study Review Team found Jordan Customs approach a promising example of putting into practice meaningful incentives that recognize good behaviour.

 

At the National Institute of Training, the Joint Learning Study Review Team heard the importance of giving officials reasons to accept, support, and comply with a Code of Con­duct. The training is not meaningful to officials, we were told, unless officials see the relevance to their lives and jobs – there need to be consequences. Without consequences, why care? Jordan Customs has developed and implemented a program that answers the question of why an official should care. That agency’s program can be a model that agencies in Jordan and elsewhere in the world might adapt and adopt.

 

The notion of incentives for superior behaviour is not limited to individuals. Recognition of superior behaviour can also be a motivator for government agencies; see, for example, the King Abdullah II Award of Excellence to which this report gives specific mention at Paragraph III K.

 

Remark

 

Jordan might identify a range of specific incentives it can provide to officials as a means of fostering acceptance, support, and compliance with the Code of Conduct.

 

 

 

C.      Role of employee evaluations in strengthening government integrity

 

The Joint Learning Study’s Review Team was favourably impressed by Jordanian agencies that included compliance with ethical standards as a significant portion of regular employee reviews. The Review Team discovered two notable examples, the Food and Drug Administration and Jordan Customs. These two agencies reported that managers undertake a written review of each employee’s job performance every three months. Performance reviews equipped the agencies’ managers with information that permitted the managers to offer incentives and to apply consequences to effect the Code of Conduct. Jordan is well positioned to extend these programs to additional agencies.

 

Remark

 

Jordan might consider expanding to additional departments and agencies, the Food and Drug Administration’s and Jordanian Customs’ practice of making ethical behaviour a significant portion of periodic employee evaluations.

 

 

 

D.      Fostering awareness and devising educational programs

 

The Joint Learning Study mission found, among the agencies, varying capacities for devising and effecting education programs.

 

The Joint Learning Study mission found that awareness of standards of ethical conduct varied from agency to agency; some with high-level awareness – generally in which top management had implemented quarterly employee reviews – to virtually no awareness.

 

The Ministry of Finance said that it has provided training about the codes of conduct to all of its civil servants and has tested its employees’ awareness of them. Of the Ministry’s employees, 58% are aware of the main components of the Ministry’s code. Sixty-seven percent are aware of the main components of the national Code of Conduct.

 

The Review Team heard evidence of the importance of train-the-trainer approaches and the impor­tance of creating interactive activities such as role playing, joint problem solving, use of hypothetical situations, and participatory events to identify recurring and significant risk – in other words approaches to engage and inform the adult learner (beyond lecture).

 

The National Institute of Training impressed the Joint Learning Study Review Team as being aware of best training practices for adult learners, including dimensions of the subject/content of the trainings, their style of training; the audience to train and the frequency of training.

 

Representatives of the National Institute of Training who met with the Joint Learning Study Review Team were clear that people need a reason to learn. Why should any­one submit to “ethics” training? An answer becomes clearer if, in addition to gaining a fuller appreciation of the importance of ethical processes for good government and citizens’ confidence in government, there are consequences to compliance and non-compliance. Other sections of this report take up the issues of incentives, penalties, and mangers’ periodic assessment of employees’ ethical behaviour.

 

The Institute reports that it has a leadership-training program that focuses on good government and provides training on anti-corruption, integrity, and governance but adds that it lacks Jordanian examples and study cases, perhaps because of officials’ reluctance to come forward with actual cases.

 

Even though the Institute is well positioned to undertake educational programs for the nation, it acknowledges that it should approach each government institution with an offer to design training for that institution. Jordan Customs say that it will create its own training center. The Jordan Food and Drug Administration uses training, workshops, and roundtables.

 

At a meeting at the King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence, the Review Team was favourably impressed by the Centre’s efforts to inculcate principles of quality management into Jordan’s governmental institutions. The Centre’s establishment by Royal Decree and the royal family’s involvement in the Centre’s administration demonstrate leadership from the top that the report discusses elsewhere.

 

Remark

 

To devise and implement educational programs about the elements of a code of ethical conduct – such as how to address ethical issues, how to secure guidance about the code’s application to specific situations – as well as consequences of compliance and non-compliance, the Government of Jordan might consider:

·                             employing the support of top management;

·                             enlisting the assistance of news organizations;

·                             working with and through chambers of commerce and associations of business and industry;

·                             routinely placing in government contracts and documents standard, nation-wide, uniform language explaining that payments and gifts to government officials are neither expected nor tolerated.

 

The King Abdullah II Centre for Excellence could play an important role in promoting high standards of ethical conduct among gov­ernmental officials by introducing compliance with and effective promotion of the Code of Conduct as a criterion for King Abdullah II Award of Excellence.

 

 

 

E.      A two-way street

 

The Code of Conduct and Ethics for Career Public Office forbids an employee to accept certain gifts [Article 8] and to use his or her position to obtain finan­cial gain or anything of value for the benefit of the employee or the employee’s family [Article 9].

 

Why would the government official shoulder the full burden of upholding standards of conduct when tempted by an improper, illegal offer from an individual or business?

 

Many governments; code of conduct have a provision of this type:

 

No person, business, or organization may give to a government official, directly or indirectly, and no government official may solicit or accept from any person, business, or organization, directly or indirectly, anything of value than can reasonably be expected to influence the official’s vote, official action, or judgment, or could reasonably be considered a reward for the official’s action or inaction. 

 

Consequences for the furnisher of an improper gift discourage the offer, even before an official must address the situation, thereby encouraging compliance. Forbidding an individual or organization to give a government official a prohibited gift or something of value that is reasonably likely to influence an official adds an important deterrent to conduct.

 

Remark

 

With attention to its capacity to educate and enforce, Jordan may consider prohibiting organizations and individuals to furnish what the Code of Conduct forbids officials to accept.

 

 

 

F.      Gifts and gift registry

 

Gift giving is a social custom practiced all over the world and in many aspects of life. Gifts might be exchanged within families and offered in significant relationships. The code of conduct is the right instrument to address the receipt of gifts of civil servants in order to clarify for government officials what is acceptable behaviour and what will not be tolerated, in particular as:

 

§  The Government wields its power through public servants in whom the power is temporarily placed.  The official to whom governmental power is entrusted should use the power to benefit the legitimate interests of government, not the private interest of the individual. 

 

§  Through the code of conduct, the Government can influence citizens perception that it is committed to instil the culture of integrity amongst its public servants.

 

§  The Government can prove to its citizens and businesses that, when gifts are not demanded or accepted during a governmental proceeding, business and citizens are treated in the same transparent and non-discriminatory way.

 

The Code of Conduct that the Ministry of Public Sector Development created in 2006 forbids a government employee to accept a gift that “may have a direct or indirect impact on objectivity in the implementation of its functions or would affect the decisions” [Article 8].

 

Further considerations with regards to dealing with gifts could focus around five key issues including [i] a gift’s value, [ii] an allowance for customary or traditional gifts within a country’s culture, [iii] the likelihood that a gift will affect governmental action, [iv] whether gifts are forbidden unless they fall within a permitted exception or are permitted unless they are expressly prohibited and [v] whether the limitation of gifts is on the donor, the recipient, or both.

 

During the Review Team’s visit in Jordan, the Audit Bureau told the Review Team that the Audit Bureau strictly forbids its auditors to accept meals or other gifts from officials associated with an agency being audited. 

 

Even in a jurisdiction that forbids an official to accept a gift for private benefit, there may be occasions in which a company offers to provide, for instance, computers to an agency, transportation for officials attending a governmental event, or supplies for an office.  In these instances, a registry of gifts provided to the government can be useful to demonstrate that the item or service was accepted and used for a government purpose – and not a private one – and to permit public scrutiny of the relationship between the government and its benefactor. 

 

The Ministry of Public Sector Development’s Code of Conduct says [Article 8] that the departments should maintain a register of certain gifts received and whether a gift was donated to charity, retained by the institution, or retained by the employee. This register has not been fully implemented.

 

Remark

 

To give greater clarity to what will be permitted and what will be forbidden, Jordan might re-examine the issue of officials’ acceptance of gifts. Jordan could decide that government can administer its rule more effectively by (i) placing the burden on government to prove that a gift was accepted inappropriately or (ii) placing the burden on an employee to demonstrate that a gift received was lawful and appropriate. Jordan might also implement the gift registry that the Ministry of Public Sector Development has requested.

 

 

G.      Financial disclosure program

 

To enhance citizens’ confidence that a government official is not using a government positions to obtain financial benefits for the official, the official’s family, or the official’s business, many governments require senior officials to identify publicly the official’s sources of income and each business in which the official has a substantial investment. Beyond a declaration of assets, such as real estate and commercial investments, an effective financial disclosure program can account for sources of income; in the case of a business owned by an official or the official’s family, the business’s significant sources of income; names of business partners and associates; creditors; and donors and nature of gifts received.

 

So that the appointing authority can examine a declaration before an appointment is made and avoid appointing to a government position a person whose personal financial interests will conflict with the responsibilities of the office, the financial disclosure requirement is applied before an official is appointed. Moreover, disclosure prior to appointment guarantees that all officials will have supplied their initial declaration at virtually no financial or administrative cost to the government. 

 

A financial disclosure program’s value continues only if the declaration is updated periodically, for example, every twelve months, after a change in position, or significant change of financial interest, whichever occurs first.  The notes to the Council of Europe’s recommended code (2000) put it this way:

 

“Periodic declarations of interest are essential for the effectiveness of this measure. Keeping this in mind, the code provides that the declaration will be made not only upon appointment but also at regular intervals thereafter determined by national legislation. Any change in the situation affecting the public official’s interests will imply the obligation for him or her to submit a new declaration”.

 

Although financial disclosure requirements are most often imposed upon officials holding high-level positions, financial disclosure requirements might extend to mid-level positions, or even deeper, as situations merit. 

 

In the United States and its many states with financial disclosure requirements the financial reports are readily available to the public.  This approach is thought to be a highly effective means of securing compliance, preventing officials from entering into financial relationships that will compromise their execution of public responsibilities, and identifying potential conflicts. In contrast, the Council of Europe, in name of protection of private life, recommends the confidentiality of declarations.

 

Remark

 

Jordan might consider whether to enhance requirements for senior officials’ public identification of the sources of their families’ income and the businesses in which they have financial interests.

 

 

 

H.      Fostering compliance by providing guidance

 

An effective government integrity program emphasizes prevention of conflicts and addressing issues before the issues become problems. One element of this program can be to help officials apply the Code of Conduct to a situation before action is taken. Among the most established and respected govern­mental ethics agencies in North America for instance, many will say that providing advice is the most important service they provide to foster compliance with standards of ethical conduct.

 

An effective ethics program is not based solely on catching violations of the code. An effective ethics programs prevents violations from occurring. Most officials are well intentioned; they do not want to violate the law; they do not want to embarrass themselves, or their families, or their gov­ernment agencies by taking an action that the law forbids. If an official is uncertain about how a code of conduct applies to a specific circumstance, the official should not be obliged to guess. Conflicting interests can sometimes be difficult for an official to recognize and self-diagnose. An effective code of conduct will give the official a means to seek advice about a matter, in confidence and without risk of penalty, before the official acts.

 

Confidentiality of requestor’s identity. As an inducement for an official to seek advice before an issue becomes a problem, effective ethics laws per­mit the official to seek advice from the administering agency in confidence, and forbid the administering agency to reveal publicly the identity of a person seeking advice.

 

Reliance on advice. As an inducement for an official to seek advice before an issue becomes a problem, effective ethics laws permit an official to rely on the advice that the law’s administrator provides, as long as the official has disclosed all the pertinent facts. This means that means that an official who has been candid about the facts will never be penalized for relying on the advice of the law’s administrator.

 

Publication of advice and consistency of opinions. If advisory opinions remained confidential, there would be a threat that officials asking about similar circumstances might receive dissimilar advice. Effective ethics agencies publish their advisory opinions after modifying them so as not to identify the requestor. This approach makes it clear to officials, reporters, and citizens that the ethics administrator’s advice is consistent. In addition, the published body of opinions establishes, over time, significant precedents.

 

Remark

 

Jordan might consider establishing a mechanism for an official to obtain prompt, confidential, authoritative advice about the application of the Code of Conduct to a situation to which the official is or may become a party.

 

 

 

I.       Complaints, investigations, adjudication, and legal procedures 

 

When a potential problem or allegation of an official’s improper action comes to government’s attention, the precise nature of the putative offense, the severity, and the officials involved cannot be known before investigation. It is only after the fact-finding that the competent official or tribunal can determine whether the matter is better treated as an offense appropriately dealt with under the anti-corruption laws, the Code of Conduct, or elsewhere, for example as a personnel matter.

 

During all stages, from the investigation’s launch to the matter’s adjudication, the public servant’s right to know the charges against her or him, to present his or her own witnesses and evidence to defend against the charges, and to have the matter decided by a fair, neutral, detached decision maker will have to be protected. 

 

Nevertheless, there remain many issues to be addressed:  Who will investigate a potential violation of the Code of Conduct? What powers will the person or agency have? What training or experience should an investigator possess? May an agency begin a complaint even if a complaint has not been filed? Should a complaint be public or confidential? How rapidly must an investigation be completed? These are some of the issues which remain to be addressed. 

 

Remark

 

Jordan has an opportunity to adopt best practices for dealing with complaints, investigations, and legal procedures for handling their investigation and adjudication. Jordan may look to many countries and regional governments to avail itself of established governmental ethics agencies’ experience with and records of accomplishment of dealing with integrity dilemmas.

 

 

 

J.       Consequences of violating a code of ethical conduct

 

What should be the range of consequences for someone who does not meet the minimum standards of the Code of Conduct?

 

Effective governmental ethics agencies have observed that if penalties for non-compliance are too modest the code of conduct is not an effective deterrent to improper behaviour. The Audit Bureau made it clear that for a law to have respect it must be enforced. The Civil Service Bureau’s suggestion for dealing with corruption is to enforce the criminal laws. Moreover, people may not perceive the Code of Conduct with little or no penalty as an adequate remedy for a serious violation. On the other hand, ethics agencies have learned that, if the penalty for a violation of a code is too severe, the administering agency will be reluctant to impose a penalty.

 

Best practice is to let the punishment fit the crime. This means equipping the administrator with a full range of penalties such as warning, reprimand, loss of pay, monetary fine, delay of promotion, suspension, removal from office. Under some ethics codes, a contractor or licensee who participates in the violation of the code may be barred or prohibited from future public contracting or license application for a set period of time.

 

The Customs Bureau spoke of its hard and tender approach of dealing with employees’ behaviour. The Bureau can be firm in adhering to its standards but can distinguish between a person’ making an honest mistake and a person’s acting with a corrupt motive.

 

Remark

 

Make the punishment fit the violation. Given its own cultural norms and the nature and extent of penalties already in place for other transgressions, Jordan may identify a range of consequences available to the Code of Conduct’s administrator.

 

 

 

K.      Agencies cooperation and other linkages

 

The Review Team met with the Audit Bureau, Civil Service Bureau, Anti-Corruption Commission, Ombudsman Bureau, Ministry of Public Sector Development including the National Institute of Training, National Executive Training Program, and other agencies; all of which could play a role in receiving complaints, investigations, employee education, and employment practices. How these agencies deal with each other and with the administrator of the Code of Conduct will significantly affect the Code of Conduct’s success.

 

The Audit Bureau, in its normal course of business, may uncover a matter that could be treated by the Code of Conduct and Ethics. A matter exam­ined by the Anti-Corruption Commission might be appropriately transferred for follow-up under the Code of Conduct. The Ombudsman Bureau may receive a complaint that the administrator of the Code of Conduct would investigate. The Ministry of Public Sector Development’s National Institute of Training, may find itself obliged to confer with a variety of agen­cies to design ethics training seminars tailored to each agency’s circumstance.

 

The cooperation and linkages among agencies might come from enactment of legislation that assigns to one institution responsibility for all efforts to foster high standards of conduct and ethics within the government. It can, also come from a directive of the Prime Minister, the National Committee or other coordinating committee, or through encouragements and recognitions that might come from the King Abdullah II Center for Excellence. Many avenues are possible.

 

Remark

 

After assessing the many options available to it, Jordan might select and implement a mechanism that accounts for the related responsibilities of and relations among the key administrator of the Code of Conduct and other government agencies.

 

                                                                                             

 

 

Part IV. PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

 

The objective of the Joint Learning Study on Jordan “Implementing Codes of Conduct and Ethics in the Civil Service” is to deliver an assessment of the status of Jordan’s implementation of the Code of Conduct in the Civil Service, developed by the Ministry of Public Sector Development in 2006. The Study also aims to assess how this Code of Conduct fits into the Jordanian government’s efforts to fight corruption and enhance public integrity. Additionally, the Joint Learning Study is to provide proposals and good practices for improving the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct.

 

Through the Joint Learning Study, the OECD is pleased to support Jordan’s integrity programs that aim to implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The Government of Jordan has driven this Study, providing the OECD Secretariat with legislation, regulations, reports, and other documents related to the implementation of the Code of Conduct and to its wider context of promoting integrity. The Study’s first phase included the selection of interviewees and target organizations from Jordan and policy experts from OECD and Arab countries. Jordan’s government approved these project stakeholders before the project began in earnest.

 

In order to realize the Study’s objective of equipping Jordan with proposals for action, the Study benchmarks the standards defined in the Jordanian Code of Conduct to international good practices. To assure knowledge of international standards and country practices and in-depth policy discussion among peers, the Study drew policy experts from three continents. They came from the Kingdom of Bahrain, Austria, and the United States of America.

 

This assessment has resulted in six key proposals for Jordan’s consideration.

 

 

Proposal No. 1: Establish a concise, uniform, enforceable code of conduct and ethics.

 

A great body of international evidence indicates that effective codes of conduct are concise. The United Nations International Code of Conduct for Public Officials occupies less than two standard pages of text (See Annex D). A uniform message is critical. Although specific risks and work practices of agencies may merit additional, agency-specific attentions, study of nations’ successes demonstrate that a uniform standard applicable to all public officials is important to a code’s success.

 

Jordan’s many ministries and agencies are currently embarked upon different public integrity programs. Some have put a measure of reliance upon the Code of Conduct and Ethics for Career Public Office adopted by the Ministry of Public Sector Development during 2006. Some agencies have implemented their own integrity programs, independent of the actions of other agencies. The absence of a national standard means that citizens, businesses, and government officials lack a generally recognized expectation of appropriate behaviour by government officials.

 

Jordan’s government might re-examine the current Code of Conduct to limit it to a concise, uniform, nationwide, rule-based, enforceable statement of core values that each agency or governmental unit may supplement to address the specific nature of the agency’s / unit’s work and risks. To achieve this, Jordan could shorten the Code, for instance, by omitting references to strikes, internet and email use, and work rules unrelated to ethical standards.

 

Jordan’s enforcement of a common standard of conduct for all of government’s officials, as long as it is concise and clear enough to be easily understood and applied, will immediately signal to government officials as well as to the citizens and business that deal with them, that government is promoting improved integrity of government actions.

 

 

Proposal No. 2: Choose an administrator of the Code that will provide independence, consistency, and confidence.

 

The world’s experience demonstrates that a nation’s code of conduct and ethics cannot succeed unless its administrator is “above” politics. Success arrives only when a code’s application is steadfast, not buffeted by powerful forces or short-term interests. Officials and citizens can rely on a code only if the consistency of its application is unwavering.

 

Jordan’s National Committee, created under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Sector Development, with its many members, all with different primary responsibilities, is limited in its effectiveness as administrator of the Code. Nevertheless, the Committee could be very useful in communicating information and coordinating educational programmes about the Code of Conduct. Jordan’s use of commissions can lend stability and consistency to a program, and the government can set the length of terms, the overlap of terms, and the qualifications of office to promote political independence and consistency.

 

For administration of the Code of Conduct, Jordan might give careful attention to selecting a mechanism that affords consistency of opinions, uniformity of the Code’s application throughout agencies, institutional memory, citizens’ and governmental officials’ faith and confidence in the integrity of decisions, economy, and efficiency.

 

Creation of an administrative body that relies on precedent to afford consistency of opinions will furnish Jordan’s officials and citizens with faith and confidence in the integrity of the code of conduct’s application.

 

 

Proposal No. 3: Give the Code a legal basis and procedures for enforcement.

 

Wherever in the world codes of conduct for government officials exist, they exist as part of a government’s legal fabric. Most codes are established by an act of a legislature. In governments that have a strong executive, a code may come from the decree of a king, president, or governor. Occasionally a code of conduct is part of a government’s basic constitution. Common to all these approaches is the idea that, to be effective, a code of conduct must be backed by law.

 

Jordan lacks a legal basis for its Code of Conduct. Without legal backing, [1] the Ministry of Public Sector Development, despite its good efforts, has not succeeded in establishing a code of conduct applicable to all Jordanian public officials; [2] the National Institute for Training is challenged to equip officials with a reason for learning about a code; [3] government ministries, commissions, and bureaus are left to devise their own attempts to enforce good behaviour; [4] powers to investigate possible violations and protections of individuals are not spelled out.

 

Jordan might give careful attention to providing a legal basis for its code of conduct and ethics as well as means of dealing with complaints, investigations, procedures for investigation and adjudication, and consequences for violations of ethical standards.

 

Benefits that will flow to Jordan in giving a legal foundation to its code of conduct are both psychological – the signal that the government is serious about raising standards of government service – and administrative – the tools to investigate and enforce. An additional benefit should be the articulation of the procedural protections and rights of people investigated and accused of violating the code.

 

 

Proposal No. 4: Permit an official to obtain written advice about the Code’s application.

 

To be a success, it is not enough that a code investigate and punish bad behaviour after it has occurred. Internationally, experienced administrators of codes of conduct are agreed that the most successful ethics programs help government officials avoid and mitigate conflicts between their personal interests and their governmental responsibilities.

 

Jordan lacks a mechanism whereby a government official confronted by an ethical dilemma can get authoritative advice on which the official can rely before the official acts.

 

The government might consider permitting an official to obtain prompt, written, authoritative advice from the Code’s administrator about the Code’s application to a situation to which the official is or may become a party. If an official seeks advice, in writing, about a matter before the official acts, has provided all the material facts, and follows the advice, then the official may not later be penalized for violating the code of conduct. A written record nails down the facts and avoids ambiguity and misunderstanding about the situation being addressed. The enforcement body (the administrator of the Code) should be the body that provides the advice in order to ensure consistent and enforceable interpretation of the Code. Although all opinions should be published, the administrator, in order to encourage officials to seek advice, could consider redacting opinions to keep the identity of requestors confidential.

 

Most importantly, establishment of a mechanism for advisory opinions will result in better government and higher confidence in governmental decisions. The program will also benefit Jordan’s officials by giving them an important legal protection if they seek and abide by advice. The program will also benefit other government officials and all citizens by establishing a public body of precedents (modified so as not identify the person seeking the advice) of the code’s application.

 

 

Proposal No. 5: Make ethical behaviour a component of periodic performance evaluations that are accompanied by incentives and consequences.

 

Worldwide, most governments attempt to achieve compliance with codes of conduct by using the threat of penalties for violations. Very few have established incentives to induce good behaviour.

 

Jordan Customs reported having the capacity to offer its employees performance incentives that might include costs of Hajj, free training in Eng­lish, financial assistance in the form of a loan. The Government Tender Directorate reports that it employs an incentive system for its employees that, in addition to recognizing work performance, might be adapted to reward ethical actions. The Ministry of Finance, too, said that it has a multi-incentive system. To implement its code of conduct, the Jordan Food and Drug Administration has designed incentives, such as a financial award to a person designated the “employee of the month”.

 

Jordan might consider extending agencies’ successful practices and making ethical behaviour a significant portion of periodic employee performance evaluations coupled with a range of incentives for ethical behaviour and a range of consequences for the code’s violation.

 

In rule-based systems, officials may seek to meet only the minimum standard required and not strive to attain a higher standard of ethics. Using incentives to recognize exceptionally good conduct is beneficial as it can spur officials to still higher standards while insisting that officials comply with the written rules.

 

 

Proposal No. 6: Foster awareness of the Code’s content through specifically designed educational programmes.

 

Promoting and realizing high ethical conduct of government officials through prevention is generally considered as being more efficient than spending much time and money to punish violations after they have occurred.

 

Awareness of standards of ethical conduct varies from the highest levels to virtually no awareness among Jordan’s agencies. The National Institute of Training operates a leadership-training program that focuses on good government and provides training on anti-corruption, integrity, and governance. The Institute is aware of good training practices for engaging and informing adult learners, including train-the-trainer approaches and the impor­tance of interactive activities such as role playing, joint problem solving, use of hypothetical situations, and participatory events to identify recurring and significant risk.

 

Jordan might consider how it can best design and implement specific educational programs about the elements of its Code of Conduct and that cover how to address ethical issues, how to secure guidance about the code’s application to specific situations, and consequences of compliance and non-compliance. These educational initiatives might also include educational programmes for reporters, businesses, NGOs, and the public so that all who deal with government can have common expectations about the standards of conduct they should expect government officials to observe.

 

Jordan’s expenditure of resources to promote understanding of the Code of Conduct’s content and the consequences of its violation can benefit the main objectives of achieving compliance with the Code while simultaneously benefiting the government by relieving it of the financial, time, and disruptive burdens of enforcement. Enlisting the support of a variety of non-governmental stakeholders in identifying risks, refining the curriculum, and participating in educational programs may have the benefit of securing allies that improve the Code’s acceptance, public support, implementation, and effectiveness.

 

By implementing the foregoing proposals, the Government of Jordan could be well equipped to address the challenges of wasta, which motivated the 2006 Code of Conduct.

 

 

Annex A: JORDAN’S LEGAL SYSTEM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.             Constitution: The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan January 1, 1952

 

Jordan's Organic Law was instituted in April 1928 under the guidance of Emir Abdullah. It provided for a consultative parliament, and Jordan's first elections were held in April of the following year. This document was transformed after Jordan gained full independence in May 1946, following the abolition of the British Mandate. A new constitution was formulated and adopted by the Legisla­tive Council on November 28, 1947. It was published as law in the Official Gazette on February 1, 1947. A few years later, the Constitution was liberalized by King Talal and ratified on January 1, 1952. It is the one in current use today.

 

Jordan’s constitution stipulates that the country is a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary system. It outlines the functions and powers of the state, the rights and duties of Jordanians, guidelines for interpretation of the Constitution and conditions for constitutional amendments. It mandates the separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and outlines the regulation of the government’s finances, as well as the enforcement and repeal of laws. Importantly, the Constitution specifically guarantees the rights of Jordanian citizens, including the freedoms of speech and press, association, academic freedom, political parties, freedom of religion and the right to elect parliamentary and municipal representatives.

 

2.             Constitution’s amendments:

 

Article 126 of the Constitution:

 

“(i) The procedure prescribed in the present Constitution with regard to draft laws shall apply to any draft law for the amendment of this Constitution, provided that any such amendment is passed by a two- thirds majority of the members of each of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. In the event of a joint meeting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in accordance with Article (92) of this Constitution, the amendment shall be passed by a two-thirds majority of the members of both Houses, provided that in both cases the amendment shall not come into force unless ratified by the King.

(ii) No amendment of the Constitution affecting the rights of the King and the succession to the Throne may be passed during the period of Regency”.

 

3.             Laws: Legislation that implements the provisions of the Constitution. The draft of the law is prepared by the Council of Ministers. It is endorsed by the two chambers of the National assembly (Majlis-el Umma) and ratified by the King. When it is published in the Official Gazette the law is formally applied.

 

 Article 91 of the Constitution:

 

The Prime Minister shall refer to the Chamber of Deputies any draft law, and the Chamber shall be entitled to accept, amend, or reject the draft law, but in all cases the Chamber shall refer the draft law to the Senate. No law may be promulgated unless passed by both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and ratified by the King.

 

Article 31:

The King ratifies the laws and promulgates them. He shall direct the enactment of such regulations as may be necessary for their implementa­tion, provided that such regulations are not inconsistent with the provisions thereof.

 

Article 93:

“i) Every draft law passed by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall be submitted to the King for ratification.

(ii) A law shall come into force after its promulgation by the King and the lapse of thirty days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette unless it is specifically provided in that law that it shall come into force on any other date.

(iii) If the King does not see fit to ratify a law, He may, within six months from the date on which the law was submitted to him, refer it back to the House coupled with a statement showing the reasons for withholding his ratification.

(iv) If any draft law (other than the Constitution) is referred back within the period specified in the preceding paragraph and is passed for the second time by two-thirds of the members of each of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, it shall be promulgated. If the law is not returned with the Royal ratification within the period prescribed in paragraph (iii) above, it shall be considered as promulgated and effective. If any draft law fails to obtain the two-thirds majority of votes, it cannot be reconsidered during the same ses­sion, provided that the National Assembly may reconsider the draft during its next ordinary session”.

 

Other modalities to propose a draft laws:

Article 95*:

(i) Any ten or more Senators or Deputies may propose any law. Such proposal shall be referred to the committee concerned in the House for its views. If the House is of the opinion that the proposal be accepted, it shall refer it to the Government for drafting it in the form of draft law, and to submit it to the House either during the same session or at the following session.

(ii) Any law proposed by Senators or Deputies in accordance with the preceding paragraph and rejected by either House shall not be presented for a second time during the same session.

* As amended in the Official Gazette No. 1380 of 4/5/1958.

 

Rejection of laws:

Article 92:

 Should either House twice reject any draft law and the other accept it, whether or not amended, both the Senate and the Chamber shall hold a joint meeting under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the Senate to discuss the matters in dispute. Acceptance of the draft law shall be conditional upon the passing of a resolution by a two-thirds majority of the members of both Houses present. If the draft law is rejected as described above, it shall not be placed again before the House during the same session.

 

4.             By-Laws: Legislation that implements the provisions of the Law, the draft by-laws is prepared by the department, agency, authority or ministry subjected to the Law and responsible for its implementation. It is endorsed by the Council of Ministers after the Legislation and Opinion Bureau reviewed it.

 

The Legislation and Opinion Bureau is affiliated to the Prime Minister. It analyzes, reviews, and amends the draft laws submitted to the Council of Ministers. It also gives legal advice to the Council of Ministers. A draft law has to be reviewed by the Bureau before it is issued by the Council of Ministers.

 

5.             Decisions interpretations: there are two types of legal interpretation

 

a)            Interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions; explained by the Article 122 of the Constitution:

The High Tribunal provided for in Article (57) shall have the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution if so requested either by virtue of a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a resolution taken by the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies passed by absolute major­ity. Such interpretation shall be implemented upon its publication in the Official Gazette”.

b)            Interpretation of a Law provisions; explained by the Article 123 of the Constitution:

i) The Special Tribunal (Diwan Khass) may interpret the provisions of any law which have not been interpreted by the courts if so requested by the Prime Minister.

(ii) The Special Tribunal shall consist of the President of the highest Civil Court as chairman, two of its judges and one senior administrative official, who shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers, as members. It shall also include a member delegated by the Minister concerned from among the senior officials of the Ministry which is involved in the needed interpretation.

 

6.             Agreements:

 

Article 33:

Treaties and agreements which involve financial commitments to the Treasury or affect the public or private rights of Jordanians shall not be valid unless approved by the National Assembly. In no circumstances shall any secret terms contained in any treaty or agreement be contrary to their overt terms.

 

 

Annex B:

 

The Jordanian Code of Conduct and Ethics for career public office (employment)

 

 

Article (1):

This code-called Code of Conduct and Ethics for career public office (employment), and employed (valid) as of the date of approval from (by) the Council of Ministers.

 

 

Article (2):

The definitions contained in the civil service system No (55) in 2002 are recommended for the purposes of this Code.

 

 

Article (3):

 

This Code shall apply to all staff subject to civil service and the staff of independent institutions and departments.

Each new employee and before commence work must sign a pledge of commitment to this code, and kept a copy of this pledge in his file career.

This code is based on the foundations and principles of justice, and equal opportunity, transparency, accountability, professional, integrity, neutrality, and belonging to the homeland and the Service and insisting on achieving its mission objectives and responsibility, and the employee must committed to the provisions of this Code in addition to the foundations and principles that based on it.

Any violation of the provisions of the Code requires accountability and to take disciplinary action and penalties in accordance with the rules of this system.

 

 

Article (4):

 

This code aims to:

 

Establishing (Anchorage) ethical standards, rules and basic principles for public office ethics, values and culture of professionalism among civil service staff, promote commitment to these standards, norms and values, and consoli­date the foundations of good practices and good governance, through awareness of civil service staff and directing them toward right careers ethics and self-discipline, which frames Govern the functioning of the civil service and consistent with applicable laws and regulations, as well as through the statement of duties and responsibilities of career and role in improving services and strengthening the credibility of public service.

Strengthen the confidence of citizens and recipients of public service of government institutions work, increasing respect and appreciation for its role in providing best services.

 

 

Article (5):

The general duties and responsibilities of employee,

 

The employee should:

Perform his duties and functions entrusted to him actively seeking secretariat impartiality, accuracy and professionalism, impartiality and the maxi­mum potential, and work to serve the goals and objectives and achieving the public interest only.

To ensure familiarity with the laws and regulations in force and applied without any abuse or violation or neglect.

Devote hours to perform official functions and duties of his job, and not doing any activity that does not respect his or her official duties.

Quest to improve performance and develop its professional and see the latest developments in the field of work and that of the Chamber that works for, and submit proposals that would improve the working methods and raise the level of performance in the constituency, and assistance in providing safe and healthy working environment.

Refrain from any acts or practices or acts violate morality and ethical conduct, and to refrain from harming the political views or religious beliefs of oth­ers inside or outside the constituency or incitement against it.

Facilitate the investigation and inspections by the competent authorities in all possible means and to provide information and answer queries in possession of those responsible for the tasks of investigation and inspection, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force.

Non-strike action, or inciting others, and refrain from organizing petitions collective job-related or participate in the organization, whatever the reasons and motives are, and commitment in ways that appeal to be followed.

Fulfill all receivables financial implications of the Service in accordance with the laws and regulations in force without delay.

 

 

Article (6):

Dealing with others:

 

In dealing with the recipients of service, the employee should:

Respect the rights and interests of others without exception, dealing with the public to respect the bouquet and tact and neutrality and impartiality and objec­tivity, without discrimination based on race or gender or religious beliefs, political or social status, age or physical status or any form of discrimination.

Seeking to gain public trust through integrity, responsiveness and good behavior in all its work in line with laws, regulations and instructions in force.

Completion the required transactions in speed and accuracy within the bounds of jurisdiction, and to answer the queries and complaints of service recipients accurately and objectively and speed, and the reasons in case of disapproval or delay access to their transactions.

Provide the information required to service recipients and on the work and activities of his department accurately and quickly without deceive or mislead in accordance with the legislation in force, and guide them to the complaints mechanism in the event of a desire to lift the complaints to the concerned authorities.

To give priority attention and care for people with special needs and provide aid and assistance to them.

Dealing with documents and personal information relevant to the people who deal with them strictly confidential and in accordance with the laws and regulations, and not to exploit such information for personal purposes.

Refrain from any action that adversely affects public confidence in the civil service.

 

In dealing with his superiors, the employee should:

Strictly enforced the orders of his managers, directives and instructions as hierarchy, and if those orders and instructions in violation of the legislation in force the employee should informs the President in writing to the violation occurred, nor is committed to the implementation of these orders and instructions only if confirmed by the President in writing, and in this case he can informs the Audit Bureau violation occurred , And in all cases, the employee should refuses to implement the instructions if they constitute a breach or violation of a misdemeanor or felony punishable under the Penal Code or any other legislation in force.

Dealing with his superiors to respect and not to attempt to gain any preferential treatment methods Flattery or through deception or through the medium and favoritism.

Non deceive or mislead his superiors, and to refrain from concealing information related to his work aimed at influencing the decisions taken, or obstruction of work, and it should cooperate with his superiors and providing opinion, advice and expertise possessed by all objectivity and sincerity, and make disposition of the information in his possession in the interest of work.

Inform his superior about any abuse or violation or difficulties encountered in the workplace.

Keep his new direct supervisor fully and accurately to the subjects and documents including the outstanding matters, to ensure business continuity.

 

In dealing with colleagues, the employee should:

To respect and sincerity with his colleagues, maintaining good relations and friendly relations with them, without distinction and careful to respect their privacy and refrain from exploiting any information pertaining to their own lives in order abuse.

Cooperation with his colleagues and share their opinions of high professionalism and objectivity and assistance wherever possible to solve the problems they face in employment, and ensure the dissemination of positive trends among colleagues to help improve the performance of work and improve the working environment and the institutional culture of sound root in the department.

Refrain from any acts or practices or immoral acts violating public morality and ethical conduct, and the commitment of men to respect women's colleague, and his partner at work.

 

In dealing with subordinates, the employee should:

Develop the capacity of his subordinates, motivate and help them to improve their performance, and be a good example for them in work to be bound by laws, regulations and instructions in force.

Transfer of knowledge and experience gained by his subordinates and to encourage them to increase information exchange and transfer of knowledge among them.

Supervising his subordinates and accountability for their actions, assess their performance objectively and impartially and strive to provide training and development opportunities for them in accordance with the related regulations and instructions.

Rejected any pressure from a third party to deal with the subordinate preferential treatment.

Respect his subordinates rights and cooperate with them in a high professionalism without favoritism or discrimination.

Commitment to write directives to his subordinates in the case received a note written by his subordinate that his orders or directives issued by the violation of the legislation in force.

 

 

Article (7):

Maintaining confidentiality and mechanisms for disclosure of information:

 

The Employee should:

Non-disclosure of official information and documents and documents obtained or accessed during a function, whether in writing or orally or electroni­cally, and passed on confidential instructions or decisions or special legislation, or must remain confidential even after the expiry of his term, unless he has a written approval from the minister.

Refrain from making any comment or statement or intervention on issues still under study or deliberation with government agencies.

Inform the Secretary-General in the event his request for a certificate to the competent courts, unless the testimony concerned the law prohibits the disclosure of information and in conformity with the laws and regulations.

Disclose full and accurate information on every official that require disclosure of ex-officio.

 

 

Article (8):

Accept or request gifts, privileges and other benefits:

 

 The Employee should:

Not to accept or request any gift or hospitality or any other benefits of any kind, whether directly or through the medium, may have a direct or indirect impact on objectivity in the implementation of its functions or would affect the decisions, or had compelled him to commit something for acceptance.

When the employee in the case could not be refused gifts, hospitality or other benefits that do not apply to cases in paragraph (a) of this article, or when it is believed that the acceptance of certain types of hospitality will benefit the institution, the employee should inform his direct chief, and the chief should inform the employee in writing whether to reject gifts, hospitality or other benefits or retained by the Service, or donated to charity or disposed of or retained by the employee concerned.

The department should opened a special register gifts provided to the department to register the gifts listed in paragraph (b) of this article and how to deal with it, whether through keep it or donated or retained by the employee.

 

 

Article (9):

Conflict of interests:

 

 The Employee should:

Refrain from any activity that would lead to the emergence of a real or apparent conflict or a potential reconciliation between personal interests on one hand and the functional responsibilities and tasks on the other.

Refrain from any activity which is not commensurate with the objective and impartial performance of his duties, or can lead to preferential treatment for the natural or legal persons in their dealings with the government, or harms the reputation of his department, or subject its relationship with the public at risk.

Inform his direct supervisor in writing immediately in the event of conflict of interests with any person in his dealings with the government, or if a conflict arose between personal interest and public interest, or subjected to official pres­sure incompatible with his official duties, or raises doubts about the objectivity that should be dealt with Clarify the nature of the relationship and how is the inconsistencies, and the President should take immediate action to do so. In all cases must be taken into account public interest in addressing this incompatibility.

Not to use his job directly or indirectly to obtain financial gain or anything of value for the benefit of its own or his family.

Non-exploitation or recruitment information obtained during the performance of his official duties and after-work in the constituency, to achieve personal bene­fit for him self or others directly or indirectly, or to harm to others, and not to dis­close information to give a concession unfair or unreasonable to other parties.

Must obtain the necessary approvals and deputations accordance with the laws and relevant regulations in force, in the case wish to participate in the proc­ess of collecting donations or prizes or in-kind contributions to charitable organi­zations, the President may direct request from the employee reduction activities, modified or terminated when he finds that will have a real Or apparent or potential conflict in interest.

To avoid establishing close relationships with individuals or institutions rely heavily on his decisions or his department.

Not accepting a post, during the year from the date of the legacy of action, in any institution has had official dealings with the Chamber that important work only under the written consent of the minister. It also does not